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Abstract
We analyze financial interactions between fundamentalists and chartists within a heteroge-
neous agent model, focusing on discovering whether the presence of fundamentalists is enough
to stabilize prices. In contrast to related work, which is based on simulations, we analytically
prove that the presence of fundamentalists is not sufficient to avoid asset price bubbles. The
behavior of trend followers can result in exploding prices irrespective of fundamentalists’
investment decisions. We derive the upper boundaries for positive feedback traders’ invest-
ments necessary to avoid exploding prices. In this situation, intervention measures might be
necessary in order to stabilize stock/asset markets.
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1 Motivation
Financial market bubbles have repeatedly caused major macroeconomic problems, a very
prominent example of which was the subprime havoc of 2007/2008.1 While misguided macroe-
conomic policies are chief among the usual suspects in trying to understand such aberrations,
an important strand of the literature focuses on the question of whether specific behavior
of market participants is responsible for price bubbles. In particular, heterogeneous agent
models (HAMs) analyze how both chartists and fundamentalists are able to determine asset
price movements.2
Chartists, for example trend followers, trade based only on information about the price
process, that is, they assume that all important information is present in the asset price.3 In
contrast, fundamentalists have some fundamental value in mind and trade based on perceived
over- or undervaluation of the underlying asset. Trend followers magnify the current trend,
either positively or negatively, because their trading is based on the philosophy that the
greater the absolute value of the slope of the price process, the more that should be invested
or disinvested.4 Fundamentalists, in contrast, invest or disinvest, that is, increase or decrease
their investment, when the price is below or above the fundamental value, thereby pushing the
asset price toward its fundamental value. Traders act out of self-interest with the intention
1C. M. Reinhart and K. Rogoff. This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton
University Press, 2009.
2C. H. Hommes. “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”. In: Handbook of Computa-
tional Economics, Volume 2. Ed. by L. Tesfatsion and K. L. Judd. Elsevier, 2006, pp. 1109–1186.
3B. Graham, D. L. F. Dodd, and S. Cottle. Security Analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934.
4M. Covel. Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets. 1st. FT Press,
2004. isbn: 978-0-131-44603-7.
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of making a profit, and give little thought to how their actions will impact prices. As a
consequence of the two different investment strategies, the presence of chartists can cause
exploding prices,5 whereas fundamentalists are associated with a stabilizing influence on
assets. Thus, the following question arises:
Are the balancing effects of fundamentalists strong enough compensate for the
destabilizing impacts of chartists?
HAMs are increasingly employed in search of an answer to this question.6,7 The models
typically use bounded rational agents, (imperfect) heuristics or rules of thumb, and non-
linear dynamics (which might be chaotic). Some studies find that the stabilizing effects of
fundamentalists are not necessarily strong enough to stabilize markets.8 However, the results
are usually obtained via simulations and are not analytically proven,9,10 thus leading to a
5J. B. De Long et al. “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation”.
In: Journal of Finance 45.2 (1990), pp. 379–395. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03695.x.
6A. Gaunersdorfer and C. H. Hommes. A nonlinear structural model for volatility clustering. CeNDEF
Working Papers 05-02. Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and
Finance, 2005; C. H. Hommes. “Modeling the stylized facts in finance through simple nonlinear adaptive
systems”. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 99.4 (2002),
pp. 7221–7228; T. Lux. “Herd Behaviour, Bubbles and Crashes”. In: Economic Journal 105.431 (1995),
pp. 881–896; T. Lux. “The socio-economic dyna ics of speculative markets: interacting agents, chaos,
and the fat tails of return distributions”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 33.2 (1998),
pp. 143–165; T. Lux and M. Marchesi. “Scaling and criticality in a stochastic multi-agent model of a financial
market”. In: Nature 397 (1999), pp. 498–500; T. Lux and M. Marchesi. “Volatility clustering in financial
markets: A micro-simulation of interacting agents”. In: International Journal of Theoretical and Applied
Finance 3.4 (2000), pp. 675–702.
7These studies provide useful explanations for many stylized facts, including excess volatility, high trad-
ing volume, temporary bubbles, trend following, sudden crashes, mean reversion, clustered volatility and fat
tailed distribution returns. For an excellent overview regarding HAM see Hommes. (Hommes, “Heteroge-
neous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”)
8Hommes, “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”.
9Hommes, “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”.
10An exception is the work of De Long et al. (De Long et al., “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and
Destabilizing Rational Speculation”) which investigates the effect of positive feedback traders and informed
speculators, who evaluate and consider the needs of the other market participants, especially the growing
needs of the positive feedback traders, in a three-period market model facing fundamentalists. De Long et al.
(De Long et al., “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation”) show
that the interaction of these two trader types pushes the price away from the fundamental value under specific
assumptions and despite the fundamentalists’ stabilizing behavior. The present work differs from De Long
et al. (De Long et al., “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation”) in
that we do not investigate how two types of traders—positive feedback traders and informed speculators—
jointly push up the price but instead look only at trend followers, nor do we assume a predetermined end of
the market.
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second question:
Is it possible to analytically prove that chartists’ behavior can lead to exploding
prices irrespective of fundamentalists’ compensatory effects?
The main contribution of our paper is a mathematically rigorous proof that chartists’
behavior—specifically, the behavior of linear feedback traders without rational expectations
and without information about the market (e.g., fundamental value, trading volume, or
even prices)—can overcome the stabilizing effects of traders with rational expectations of
the fundamental value. Put differently, prices explode because the stabilizing effects of fun-
damentalists are outweighed by linear feedback traders. Unstable price developments are
the result, which in turn increase the likelihood of a financial bubble. As shown in the
proof, thresholds for model-inherent values can be specified that make certain the occur-
rence of a bubble. Furthermore, there are certain values of external parameters that allow
the thresholds of the inherent values to be met. The analysis reveals that even fundamen-
talists without any liquidity constraints and with perfect information about the price, the
fundamental value, and the market’s characteristics are not sufficient to stabilize a very sim-
ply constructed market based on (excess) demand if the feedback trader’s initial investment
is large enough.
The field of applied mathematics has many new results concerning technical trading
strategies.11 For example, the performance properties of chartist strategies have been proven
and explanations given for why it is reasonable to trade according to a feedback strategy.
In contrast to the feedback trading literature, where the price taker property is usually
presumed, we study the effects of trading strategies in an HAM that displays phenomena
caused by (excess) demand.12
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the price model as well as the
investment strategies of feedback traders and fundamentalists. Section 3 answers the main
question of the paper, that is, whether the presence of fundamentalists is sufficient to stabilize
11B. R. Barmish and J. A. Primbs. “On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian
Motion stock market”. In: IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference
(CDC-ECC). 2011, pp. 2889–2894. doi: 10.1109/CDC.2011.6160731; B. R. Barmish and J. A. Primbs.
“On a New Paradigm for Stock Trading Via a Model-Free Feedback Controller”. In: IEEE Transactions on
Automatic Control PP.99 (2015), pp. 1–15. issn: 0018-9286. doi: 10.1109/TAC.2015.2444078.
12M. H. Baumann. “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”. In: American
Control Conference (ACC). 2015, pp. 3880–3885. doi: 10.1109/ACC.2015.7171935.
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the market. Section 4 presents further results based on the calculations of Section 3 and
Section 5 provides ideas for future work and concludes the paper.
2 Model Structure
The model consists of a one asset market and is populated with two types of heterogeneous
agents—fundamentalists and chartists. Their interaction with the market maker is illus-
trated in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 presents the price process in the interactive market model.
Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 introduce the traders and their expectations. For simplification of
the analysis we assume that there is only one feedback trader, that is we treat all existing
feedback traders as one average feedback trader.13
2.1 Timeline
At the beginning of every period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T}, each agent ` ∈ {FT, FU}, where FT
is the feedback trader (chartist) and FU the fundamentalist, decides how to invest based
on his investment strategy, where T is unknown or even ∞. Each investment strategy I`t is
guided by a different heuristic (rule of thu b). Based on the strategy chosen, each agent
then allocates his financial resources among the asset market. The trader is aware of past
market data. The resulting changes in the investments, denoted by ∆I`t , are cleared by
a market maker who adjusts asset prices according to (excess) demand. After the traders
have observed the price change ∆pt, and hence their own gains or losses ∆g
`
t in the recent
period, they use this information in making their next investment decision.14 It is assumed
that at the end of each period the investment is capitalized and reinvested. Based on this
understanding the price model is constructed. The timeline of the traders’ and the market
maker’s decisions and interactions is shown in Figure 1.
13There is indeed no difference between one feedback trader with an initial investment IFT0 and fixed
K, see Equation (3), and n feedback traders with initial investments
IFT0
n and the same K. That is, for
the feedback traders this summarization is without loss of generality (WLOG). Whether this assumption is
WLOG for fundamentalists, too, is left to future work.
14For all processes αt we set ∆αt = αt − αt−1 as the change of the underlying process, e.g., ∆g`t is the
period profit while g`t is the overall gain/loss of trader `.
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time
Market
Maker
Trader `
t− 1 t t+ 1
announces:
pt−1,∆g`t−1
announces:
pt,∆g
`
t
announces:
pt+1,∆g
`
t+1
computes:
pt,∆g
`
t
computes:
pt+1,∆g
`
t+1
knows:
(I`τ )τ≤t−2,(g`τ )τ≤t−1,
(pτ )τ≤t−1,(fτ )τ≤t−1,E[ft]
knows:
(I`τ )τ≤t−1,(g`τ )τ≤t,
(pτ )τ≤t,(fτ )τ≤t,E[ft+1]
determines:
∆I`t−1 and I`t−1
determines:
∆I`t and I
`
t
Figure 1: Timeline of the traders’ and the market maker’s decisions and interactions with
∆g`t = I
`
t−1 · ∆ptpt−1 .
2.2 Price Process for the Interactive Market Model
In feedback trading literature, price is usually determined through a certain price process,
for example, geometric Brownian motion (GBM), which is exogenously given.15 This implies
that the traders are not able to influence the price. To avoid this price taker property,
which is a strong restriction of every market model, agent-based price models have evolved
in the academic economics literature.16 According to these models, the price is a function
of traders’ investment decisions. We denote the sum of all traders’ changes of investment at
time t with ∆It =
∑
` ∆I
`
t . Based on the idea of interacting agents, Baumann
17 constructs
a pricing model that fulfills the law of (excess) demand, namely
(I1) pt+1 = pt, if ∆It = 0
(I2) pt+1 →∞, if ∆It →∞
(I3) pt+1 → 0, if ∆It → −∞
(I4) pt+1 strictly monotonous increasing in ∆It
15Barmish and Primbs, “On a New Paradigm for Stock Trading Via a Model-Free Feedback Controller”.
16Hommes, “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”.
17Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
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For simplification, we assume an infinite supply,18 and thus the law of supply and demand
reduces to a law of (excess) demand.19 This model, which is in a sense a natural generalization
of the GBM,20 in its general form is given by
pt+1 = pt · eM−1∆It (1)
= p0 · eM−1It (2)
where M > 0 is a scaling factor expressing the trading volume of the underlying asset.21
This pricing model is closed through a market maker.22 As is common practice, the market
maker acts as a privileged trader that sets prices according to (excess) demand (see Figure 2)
and hence ensures market clearing (cf. the role of a broker in stock markets).23,24 Baumann,
Baumann, and Herz25 show that this market model meets several stylized facts formulated
in Hommes.26
18Infinite supply is, for example, given for synthetic assests, betting slips, etc. These assets are produced
by the market. Thus, the market maker can clear the market for sure.
19Alternatively, one can define (I1)-(I4) by use of the buying/selling decision Bt := It− ptpt−1 · It−1 instead
of the change of investment It−It−1. Then, a change of investment caused by price increase would not affect
the price. Based on simulations, use of the buying/selling decision instead of the change of investment affects
the proposition of this paper only quantitatively, not qualitatively. However, a finite supply would make the
analysis much more complicated. In Baumann, Baumann, and Herz, (M. H. Baumann, M. Baumann, and
B. Herz. “Stylized facts in a phenomena emulating heterogeneous agent model”. In: [2015]. In preparation)
both the HAM for stocks using Bt and the HAM for synthetic assets using ∆It are presented.
20proven in Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
21The pricing rule of Equation (1) is similar to that one Batista et al. (J. d. G. Batista et al. “Do
investors trade too much? A laboratory experiment”. In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.03743 [2015]) use.
Unless otherwise stated, for simplicity M is set to M = 1.
22C. Drescher and B. Herz. “Monetary Shocks in Bounded Efficient Financial Markets with Bounded
Rational Agents”. In: Discussion Paper 09-12, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere (2012).
issn: 1611-3837.
23Hommes, “Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance”.
24Possible profit making by and survival of the market maker will not be discussed in the work at hand
but is an interesting topic for future work.
25Baumann, Baumann, and Herz, “Stylized facts in a phenomena emulating heterogeneous agent model”.
26C. H. Hommes. “Interacting Agents in Finance”. In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 06-
029/1 (2006). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.894221.
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market
maker
It =
k∑
j=1
I
`j
t
trader `2
trader `1
· · ·
trader `k
pt, g
`2
t
I`2t
pt, g
`1
t
I`1t
pt, g
`k
t
I`kt
information information
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the role of the market maker with k traders.
2.3 Feedback Traders
Barmish and Barmish and Primbs,27 and Baumann28 outline a special class of trading strate-
gies based on control techniques, namely, feedback trading. Traders engaged in this sort of
strategy are called feedback traders and utilize neither fundamentals nor the absolute asset
value in making their investments; they take into account only their own gains and losses.
Their strategy thus depends on prices relative to their previous investments, that is, feedback
traders are chartists because gains or losses, respectively, are a function of the price but not
of any fundamental value. From a control theoretic point of view, feedback traders treat
the price like a disturbance variable and their strategy needs to be robust to this disturbing
influence. In calculating a certain trader’s gain, the market maker takes into account the
trader’s investment and the asset price.29 Therefore, for feedback traders not only is it true
that the investment affects the gain, but also that the gain determines the investment.30
27B. R. Barmish. “On performance limits of feedback control-based stock trading strategies”. In: IEEE
American Control Conference (ACC). 2011, pp. 3874–3879. doi: 10.1109/ACC.2011.5990879; Barmish
and Primbs, “On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian Motion stock market”;
Barmish and Primbs, “On a New Paradigm for Stock Trading Via a Model-Free Feedback Controller”.
28Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
29The price is a function of all traders’ investment; see Section 2.2 and, especially, Figure 2.
30In the literature, continuous time models are usually applied whereas this analysis uses a discrete time
model because this is, as mentioned by Barmish and Primbs, (Barmish and Primbs, “On arbitrage possibilities
via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian Motion stock market”) the weaker, more general assumption.
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market
maker
linear
feedback
trader
gFTt = g
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1 · pt−pt−1pt−1
IFTt = I
FT
0 + K · gFTt
information
Figure 3: Schematic interaction between market maker and linear feedback trader.
One specific feedback strategy, discussed in Barmish and Primbs31 and in Baumann,32 is
the (positive) linear feedback strategy
IFTt := I
FT
0 + K · gFTt (3)
where the linear feedback trader calculates his investment IFTt at time t as a linear function
of his gain/loss function gFTt using the initial investment I
FT
0 > 0 and a feedback parameter
K > 0. Figure 3 shows a feedback loop between the gain or loss gFT of a linear feedback
trader and his investment IFT . By calculating the gain or loss of a specific trader (or group
of traders) ` via
g`t =
t∑
i=1
I`i−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(4)
where pt denotes the price process
33 and I`t the trader’s investment at time t, it follows that
linear feedback traders are trend followers given IFTt > 0 (see also Equation (7)). A trader
is called a trend follower34 if his investment increases when prices are rising and decreases
31Barmish and Primbs, “On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian Motion
stock market”; B. R. Barmish and J. A. Primbs. “On market-neutral stock trading arbitrage via linear
feedback”. In: IEEE American Control Conference (ACC). 2012, pp. 3693–3698. doi: 10.1109/ACC.2012.
6315392.
32M. H. Baumann. “On Stock Trading Via Feedback Control When Underlying Stock Returns Are
Discontinuous”. In: University of Bayreuth (2015). Preprint; submitted to IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control (TAC). url: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/21282/.
33The relative price change pt−pt−1pt−1 is called return on investment (ROI).
34cf. Covel, Trend Following: How Great Traders Make Millions in Up or Down Markets.
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when prices are falling. Note that the particular investment amount at time t ≥ 1 is given
by
∆IFTt = I
FT
t − IFTt−1 (5)
= K · (gFTt − gFTt−1) (6)
= K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(7)
whereas IFTt denotes the total investment at time t (all individual investment amounts up to
time t) of feedback trader FT . Rising prices lead to increasing gain for the linear feedback
trader if IFTt > 0 and thus his investment increas, too. Analogously, falling prices lower the
gain and the trader disinvests. Baumann35 shows that in the event only one feedback trader
is acting on the market with the price process described by Equation (1), it holds that
It > 0 ∀t, (8)
∆It > 0 ∀t, and (9)
if ∃t : ∆It > ∆It−1 (10)
⇒ ∆It+1 > ∆It. (11)
This is important as it will be shown that, together with the results of Section 3, the price
explosion effects of feedback traders, that would have occurred in absence of fundamentalists
can be compensated by fundamentalists—at least to a certain degree.
Two typical investment paths can be identified in the scenario where only one feedback-
based trader is acting on the market. The two paths are shown in Figure 4a and Figure 4b
where the asset price pt is indicated with a solid line and the feedback trader’s investment
with a dashed one. If IFT0 lies below a specific threshold, I
FT
t converges (Figure 4a), if it is
above this threshold the investment explodes (Figure 4b). Baumann36 provides a non-closed
formula determining the threshold. Specific values can be derived only through a simulation
like the one in Figure 4 and by algorithmically localizing the threshold.
Control-based trading strategies like the one presented in Barmish and Primbs37 are
35Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
36Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
37B. R. Barmish and J. A. Primbs. “Stock Trading via Feedback Control”. In: Encyclopedia of Systems
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interesting to further analyze since the literature contains several notable results, for example,
the guarantee of non-negative profit for the simultaneously long short (SLS) strategy that
has initial investment zero and consists of two linear feedback strategies for continuously
differentiable prices (arbitrage!). For prices following a GBM, for price processes allowing
for jumps (Merton’s jump diffusion model [MJDM]), and for all essentially linear prices
one can expect positive profit for the SLS strategy, i.e., E[gSLSt ] > 0 while ISLS0 = 0. 38
However, all of these settings assume the price taker property, as the price process is defined
independently of the traders’ investments. In contrast, here we abandon the price taker
property assumption and instead consider an interactive market model, as introduced in
Baumann,39 as we want to examine the price’s behavior under heterogeneous agents.
By transforming Equation (7), the feedback trader’s investment rate, we see that linear
feedback traders follow a strategy that can be written as
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 ·
pi − pi−1
pi−1
(12)
= IFTt−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆It−1 − 1) (13)
which leads to an investment of
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + K · IFTt−1 · (eM
−1∆IFTt−1 − 1), (14)
and Control. 2014, pp. 1–10. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5102-9_131-1.
38Barmish and Primbs (Barmish and Primbs, “On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized
Brownian Motion stock market”) show that a SLS strategy that is the sum of two particular and opposed
linear feedback strategies with initial investment zero always makes a positive profit under the assumption of
continuously differentiable prices. Furthermore, if in a continuous time model prices follow a GBM the SLS
strategy is expected to yield non-negative profit Barmish and Primbs. (as proven in Barmish and Primbs,
“On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian Motion stock market”) Baumann
(Baumann, “On Stock Trading Via Feedback Control When Underlying Stock Returns Are Discontinuous”)
shows that even for a discontinuous price process characterized through MJDM, SLS trading is still profitable,
independent of intensity, type, and height of jumps. Continuously differentiable prices, GBM, and MJDM
all fulfill the price taker property that is usually assumed in literature about feedback trading. (see, e.g.,
Barmish, “On performance limits of feedback control-based stock trading strategies”; Barmish and Primbs,
“On arbitrage possibilities via linear feedback in an idealized Brownian Motion stock market”). Furthermore,
Baumann and Gru¨ne (M. H. Baumann and L. Gru¨ne. “Positive Expected Feedback Trading Gain for all
Essentially Linearly Representable Prices”. In: [2015]. Preprint. url: https://eref.uni-bayreuth.de/
22592/) show that ISLS0 = 0 and E[gSLSt ] > 0 under the price taker assumption hold even for all essentially
linear prices.
39Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
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(a) IFT0 below a specific threshold: I
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(dashed line) converges. {p0 = 1,M = 1, T =
50, FT (IFT0 = 0.3,K = 1)}.
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(b) IFT0 above a specific threshold: I
FT
t
(dashed line) diverges. {p0 = 1,M = 1, T =
13, FT (IFT0 = 0.4,K = 1)}.
Figure 4: Investment of feedback traders is indicated with a dashed line, development of the
asset price pt is indicated with a solid line; note the different scaling of the vertical axes.
when only one trader, the linear feedback trader, is acting on the market.
To sum up, the idea behind the linear feedback trading strategy is that money can be
made by following the price trend.
2.4 Fundamentalists
As explained in Section 1, fundamentalists invest when the price is below the fundamental
value ft > 0 and disinvest when the price is above the fundamental value.
40 Thus, it is of
particular interest how much fundamentalists invest or disinvest in the respective cases. For
deterministic fundamental values ft, i.e., the fundamental value is a function in t, one way
of determining the investment rate is
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
. (15)
40If, for example, the fundamental value is below the asset price, fundamentalists conclude that the price
will decrease in the long run, not directly in the next step. So they do not necessarily disinvest so much that
their investment becomes negative, but they reduce their investment which is also a disinvestment.
12
DR
AF
T
Se
pt
em
be
r
23
,
20
16
In this case fundamentalists do not need to estimate the fundamental value because it is
fixed and certain. Traders following the investment rule of Equation (15) could be called
strong fundamentalists because their investment strategy could push the price back to its
fundamental value at any time. If the strong fundamentalist is the only trader buying/selling
at time t, then for any pt > 0 and ft+1 it follows:
pt+1 = pt · eln
ft+1
pt (16)
= pt · ft+1
pt
(17)
= ft+1 (18)
Section 2.5 presents the case of a fundamentalist trading based on a distorted fundamental
value. It turns out, however, that this distortion does not affect the general behavior of the
market model.
2.5 Expectations and Noise
Some types of traders, for example, informed speculators,41 base their trading decisions on
rational expectations. Is this the case for feedback traders and fundamentalists?
In general, for feedback traders and trend followers, the answer is “no,” as they only
assume the existence of a trend. For example, based on the current slope of asset price
development (pt − pt−1) they forecast the future direction of the asset. However, fundamen-
talists are assumed to have rational expectations.42 Generally, they pursue the strategy
∆IFUt = M · ln
E[ft+1|ft]
pt
. (19)
Even a casual observation of real markets makes it clear that price fluctuations are seldom
purely rational. There is always noise and uncertainty in the market, a factor considered
essential by many economists.43 Some reasons for noise include that traders make mistakes,
41De Long et al., “Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation”.
42see, e.g., Drescher and Herz, “Monetary Shocks in Bounded Efficient Financial Markets with Bounded
Rational Agents”.
43see, e.g., F. Black. “Noise”. In: Journal of Finance 41.3 (1986), pp. 529–543. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6261.1986.tb04513.x; J. B. De Long et al. “Noise trader risk in financial markets”. In: Journal of Political
13
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trade on unreliable (noisy) information, or simply enjoy trading and are not overly concerned
with being rational about it.
Here, we do not assume that traders are making mistakes, as this would lead to completely
unexpected, unsystematic behavior. Furthermore, both feedback traders and fundamental-
ists do follow a specified strategy. Thus the only way noise could enter the market is through
noisy information. However, the traders’ investments as well as the price, announced by the
market maker (see Figure 1), are not distorted. The only information that could be noisy is
that about the fundamental value. In this case, the fundamentalist has to estimate ft+1 at
time t and trade according to Equation (19). Since it is unreasonable that |ft+1 − E[ft+1]|
becomes arbitrary large but exploding prices imply |pt − ft| → ∞, the effects of noisy infor-
mation do not play a decisive role.
Therefore, we a priori consider ft a deterministic fundamental value in the presented
work.
3 Proof of Limitations of Fundamentalists’ Stabilizing
Effects
In this section we demonstrate, analytically and mathematically rigorously, that fundamen-
talists are not always able to stabilize markets through their trading actions. We inductively
prove, in contrast to simulations, that effects of linear feedback traders dominate those of
fundamentalists and destabilize markets.
Since we habe already defined the pricing model (Equation (1)) and the traders, the
next task is to check whether fundamentalists defined according to Equation (15) are able to
stabilize the price when trading simultaneously on the market with linear feedback traders
following Equations (3) and (4). To simplify the notation, we set ft ≡ 1. This is one special
case, but if we can show the destabilizing effects of feedback traders’ investment strategy for
this case, it will prove that fundamentalists do not always have market stabilizing effects. The
proof proceeds without using technical trading restrictions, for example, limits on feedback
traders’ investment amount.
These two trader types are suitable for analyzing the problem because if it turns out that
Economy 98.4 (1990), pp. 703–738. url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2937765.
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prices explode for appropriately chosen parameters IFT0 and K of linear feedback traders even
when acting on a market with fundamentalists who are employing an investment strategy
that could bring prices close to the fundamental value at every point of time, it will be strong
evidence that chartists’ rules, in this case the linear feedback strategy are able to overcome the
effects of strong fundamentalists. Why it is enough to consider only linear feedback traders
and fundamentalists and no other type of traders, some of which are presented in Baumann,
Baumann, and Herz,44 becomes obvious when taking into consideration that if feedback
traders’ investment goes to infinity which means prices explode, then also the absolute value
of fundamentalists’ investment goes to infinity. Thus, compared to the exploding investments
of feedback traders and fundamentalists, the relatively small investment45 of other possible
traders may be neglected at least for our analysis.46
Simulations reveal two typical price developments (see Figures 5a and 5b). In Figure
5a, fundamentalists’ effects predominate and the price stabilizes around the fundamental
value. In Section 4, this converging investment effect is shown when K = 1, where K is the
feedback parameter from Equation (3), and a specific limit value for IFT0 is computed. In
Figure 5b, however, market development is not that obvious. At first glance, the figure might
suggest that prices explode. But as the simulation software reaches its limits, it becomes
unclear whether or not prices level out in these simulation scenarios. We therefore need an
analytical examination. In cases like those shown in the simulated Figure 5b, the proposition
of Theorem 1 determines with certainty whether the investment of feedback traders is in fact
exploding, or whether this only looks to be the case due to simulation insufficiencies and the
investment will eventually stabilize, but with a greater amplitude, for example, as in Figure
5a.
44Baumann, Baumann, and Herz, “Stylized facts in a phenomena emulating heterogeneous agent model”.
45Trend followers invest a lot when prices rise strongly and fundamentalist disinvest a lot when price
greatly exceeds the fundamental value, i.e., the investment of trend followers goes against infinity and that
of fundamentalists goes against minus infinity. For traders who neither predicate their investment on the
distance of fundamental value and price nor on the slope of the price it is unreasonable that their investment
goes against (minus) infinity.
46For moving average traders (MA) and noise traders (NO), both presented in Baumann, Baumann, and
Herz (Baumann, Baumann, and Herz, “Stylized facts in a phenomena emulating heterogeneous agent model”)
and needed for a valid market model as also shown in Baumann, Baumann, and Herz, (Baumann, Baumann,
and Herz, “Stylized facts in a phenomena emulating heterogeneous agent model”) usually |∆IMAt | ≤ ∆I∗
and P (|∆NOt | > B) → 0 holds for B → ∞. Thus, only |∆IFTt | and |∆IFUt | can become arbitrarily large
which is the only interesting contribution for bubble analysis.
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(a) Price and feedback trader’s investment
converging, i.e., fundamentalists’ effects pre-
dominate; parameters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T =
50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 10,K = 0.5)}.
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(b) Price and feedback trader’s investment
diverging, i.e., feedback traders’ effects pre-
dominate; parameters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T =
3, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 15,K = 0.5)}.
Figure 5: Two typical situations in a market involving feedback traders and fundamentalists
(notice: T differs in the two figures for purposes of readability).
To simplify the expressions in the model, we assume that ft ≡ 1 and p0 = 1 in all
upcoming equations. This choice is just one possible scaling but does not change the model’s
dynamics in general. It holds:47
∆IFUt = M · ln
ft+1
pt
(20)
= −M · ln eM−1It−1 (21)
= −It−1 (22)
= −IFTt−1 − IFUt−1 (23)
⇒ IFUt = −IFTt−1 (24)
⇒ ∆IFUt = −∆IFTt−1 (25)
With this, we can specify Equation (13), which describes the investment of the feedback
47We define a process αt as (αt)t∈Z ⊂ R with αt = 0 ∀t < 0. Furthermore, we define the ∆-operator as
∆kαt := ∆
k−1αt − ∆k−1αt−1, ∆1αt := ∆αt = αt − αt−1, and ∆0αt := αt. A price process pt is strictly
positive, i.e., (pt)t > 0 for all t ≥ 0.
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traders:
∆IFTt = K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1+∆I
FU
t−1) − 1) (26)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1(∆IFTt−1−∆IFTt−2) − 1) (27)
= K · IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (28)
Theorem 1 tells us conditions for the feedback trader’s investment IFT and its derivatives
for which prices explode. Note that the following implication holds:
∆kIFTt−1 > a ∧ ∆k+1IFTt > b ⇒ ∆kIFTt > a + b. (29)
We obtain this directly from the definition of the delta operator which is equivalent to
∆kIFTt = ∆
k+1IFTt + ∆
kIFTt−1. (30)
Theorem 1. For the investment of the positive linear feedback trader (Equation (3)) inter-
acting with a strong fundamentalist (Equation (15)) on the market model (Equation (1)),
under conditions
∆3IFTt > M · ln 2, (31)
∆2IFTt > M · ln 2 ·max
{
1, K−1
}
, (32)
∆IFTt−1 > 0, and (33)
IFTt−2 > 0 (34)
it follows that
∆kIFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ∀k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} (35)
and
∆2IFTt+1 > M · ln 2 ·K−1. (36)
This means, the feedback trader’s investment, the slope of investment, the curvature of
investment, and the increase of the curvature of the investment are strictly greater than
M · ln 2 for all t ≥ t∗ for some t∗. All in all, this is a fast exploding investment, which leads
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to an equally quickly exploding price.
pt+1 = pt · eM−1·(∆IFUt +∆IFTt ) (37)
= pt · eln
ft+1
pt · eM−1·∆IFTt (38)
= ft+1 · eM−1·∆IFTt (39)
As an interpretation, note that under Equation (24), fundamentalists always respond one
period later with the inversed investment of feedback traders.
In other words, the feedback trader’s investment increases, the rate of increase increases,
and the rate of this growth increases. Furthermore, all of these growth rates are bounded
from below. Since the fundamentalist’s investment is minus the investment of the feedback
trader from one period before the ratio of the (dis-)invested amounts is strictly increasing,
that is the feedback trader’s exploding effect predominates the fundamentalist’s stabilizing
one. Theorem 1 is proven by induction in the following.
Proof. It is enough to prove Equation (35) for k = 3 as all other inequalities can then be
derived from Equation (29), respectively, Equation (30).
1
K
∆3IFTt+1 =
1
K
(∆2IFTt+1 −∆2IFTt ) (40)
=
1
K
(∆IFTt+1 − 2∆IFTt + ∆IFTt−1) (41)
= IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (42)
− 2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (43)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (44)
= (IFTt−2 + ∆I
FT
t−1 + ∆I
FT
t )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (45)
− 2(IFTt−2 + ∆IFTt−1)(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (46)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (47)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (48)
+ ∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (49)
18
DR
AF
T
Se
pt
em
be
r
23
,
20
16
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (50)
− 2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (51)
− 2∆IFTt−1(eM
−1∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (52)
+ IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 − 1) (53)
= IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 2eM−1∆2IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (54)
+ 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (55)
+ ∆IFTt (e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (56)
We evaluate these summands separately:
(55) = 2∆IFTt−1(e
M−1∆2IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt − eM−1∆2IFTt−1) (57)
= 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 1) (58)
> 2∆IFTt−1e
M−1∆2IFTt−1(2− 1) (59)
> 0 (60)
(56) = (∆IFTt−1 + ∆
2IFTt )(e
M−1∆2IFTt − 1) (61)
> 0 + M ·max{ln 2, ln 2
K
} (62)
> M · ln 2
K
(63)
(54) = IFTt−2(e
M−1∆2IFTt−2+M
−1∆3IFTt−1+M
−1∆3IFTt (64)
− 2eM−1∆2IFTt−2+M−1∆3IFTt−1 + eM−1∆2IFTt−2) (65)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(eM
−1∆3IFTt − 2) + 1) (66)
> IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2(eM
−1∆3IFTt−1(2− 2) + 1) (67)
= IFTt−2e
M−1∆2IFTt−2 (68)
> 0 (69)
As a result, we obtain
∆3IFTt+1 > M · ln 2. (70)
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That the conditions for the endogenous variables IFTt−2,∆I
FT
t−1,∆
2IFTt ,∆
3IFTt may be ful-
filled for some t (and some parameter assignment) is shown in Table 1 in which the investment
development of the feedback trader and its derivatives are listed for IFT0 = 15, K = 0.5, and
M = 10. In short, there are exogenous variables that lead to price explosion. This demon-
strates that feedback traders’ effects are able to overcome fundamentalists’ effects.
On the other hand, Table 2 sets out a situation where price would explode when only
feedback traders are acting on the market. Equations (8)–(10) hold for the feedback traders,
so, according to Baumann,48 their investment causes a bubble even in the absence of any
other traders. However, if fundamentalists enter the market price explosion is prevented, as
the investment rates tend to 0 at time t = 80 in Table 2. Clearly, the conditions of Theorem
1 for feedback traders are not satisfied.
In summary, even a strong fundamentalist investment rule, that is a strategy without
any restrictions and involving a possibly infinitely large investment amount, is not able
to stabilize the market when a trader using very simple linear feedback strategy with an
adequate initial investment is acting on the market, too. Market failures can happen, prices
may explode, and the investment behavior of strong fundamentalists cannot prevent this.
48Baumann, “Effects of Linear Feedback Trading in an Interactive Market Model”.
IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 15 15 15 15
t = 1 41.112668 26.112668 11.112668 -3.88733197
t = 2 83.0106859 41.8980179 15.7853499 4.67268186
t = 3 242.716956 159.70627 117.808252 102.022902
t = 4 15864296.3 15864053.3 15863893.8 15863776
Table 1: The boxed table entries fulfill the conditions of Theorem 1 for t = 3 for which prices
explode; market parameters are as in Figure 5b.
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4 Further Results for K = 1
To this point, we have demonstrated that the pricing model described in Equation (1) to-
gether with a quite simple chartist rule can create a financial bubble even when fundamen-
talists are acrive in the market. We now discuss some further results and special features of
the market model when the linear feedback trader is assumend to ba reasonable all-in feed-
back trader, that is, one who invests all of his gain but nothing more, i.e., K = 1. Formula
simplifications for the feedback trader’s investment are given for two specific cases. The first
is a market with only a linear feedback trader; the second is a market with a linear feedback
trader and a fundamentalist. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 3, if existing, the limits
of the investment are calculated. For simplicity we set M = 1.
4.1 Case 1: All-In Linear Feedback Trader
In the first case with only one linear feedback trader, Equation (14) simplifies to:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1 · (e∆I
FT
t−1 − 1) (71)
= IFTt−1 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (72)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
0 · · · e∆IFTt−1 (73)
= IFT0 · eI
FT
t−1 (74)
In the case that IFTt converges to some value it follows
lim
t→∞
IFTt = −lw(−IFT0 ), (75)
where lw denotes the Lambert-W-function.49
4.2 Case 2: All-In Linear Feedback Trader and Fundamentalist
In the second case, to arrive at the simplified feedback trader’s investment amount, we need
to rewrite Equations (13) and (28) to take into consideration the fundamentalist’s investment
49The Lambert-W-function is the inverse function of f(x) = x · ex.
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amount:
IFTt = I
FT
t−1 + I
FT
t−1(e
∆2IFTt−1 − 1) (76)
= IFT0 · e∆
2IFT0 · · · e∆2IFTt−1 (77)
= IFT0 · e∆I
FT
t−1 (78)
In the case where only linear feedback traders and fundamentalists are acting on the
market—which is also the setting of the main result in Section 3—with K = 1 it is easy to
calculate the limit of the feedback trader’s investment, assuming that one exists (see, e.g.,
Figure 6): If IFTt → c ∈ R⇒ ∆IFTt → 0 and by using Equation (78):
lim
t→∞
IFTt = I
FT
0 (79)
Figure 6a illustrates the outcome. Note that, due to Equation (28) (market with feedback
trader and fundamentalist), for K ∈ (0, 1] we have IFTt ≥ 0, i.e., the linear feedback trader
is a long trader. In contrast, for K > 1, negative investments IFTt may occur, as shown in
Figure 6b.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that trend followers may cause price explosions regardless of funda-
mentalists’ investment decisions. Specifically, Theorem 1 and its proof analytically show that
a fundamentalist’s investment strategy, that is a strategy that pushes prices toward their
fundamental values, can be insufficient to dominate linear feedback trading strategies. How-
ever, the potential for feedback traders’ to create a bubble appears to be lower (Equations
(31)–(34)) when fundamentalists are active in the market (cf. Equations (8)–(10)). Although
the results indicate that fundamentalists have a stabilizing effect, this effect is limited up to
some threshold value (cf. Table 2).
The analysis also shows that for identical investment decisions price movements are more
volatile at higher price levels compared to at lower price levels. Thus, even this simply
constructed market model is able to capture certain market phenomena.
Given our results and the fact that financial bubbles are associated with high economic
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(a) Feedback trader’s investment converg-
ing to the initial investment IFT0 ; parame-
ters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T = 50, FU(ft ≡
1), F (IFT0 = 8,K = 1)}.
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(b) Negative investment of feedback trader;
parameters {p0 = 1,M = 10, T =
50, FU(ft ≡ 1), F (IFT0 = 1,K = 10)}.
Figure 6: Two specific situations in a market model involving feedback traders and funda-
mentalists.
costs an important question arises: Seeing as fundamentalists do not appear to be an ade-
quate market stabilizing force, is there another type of trader, perhaps the market maker,
that would be able to stabilize prices in a market-appropriate way and, if so, what would
such a trader look like?
Generally, our analysis supports the view that intervention measures or at least some kind
of incentive system is necessary to stabilize asset markets and prevent financial bubbles.
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IFTt ∆I
FT
t ∆
2IFTt ∆
3IFTt
t = 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
t = 1 0.59672988 0.19672988 -0.2032701 -0.6032701
· · ·
t = 5 0.39734101 0.02131807 0.05226206 -0.069616
· · ·
t = 80 ≈0.4 ≈0 ≈0 ≈0
Table 2: The table shows a situation where price would explode without fundamentalists
but is stabilized by them. The investment parameters are the same as for Figure 4b where
prices explode. The boxed cells fulfill the conditions required by Equations (8)-(10).
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